"The Chavez Code" by Eva Golinger

English Translation by Sue Ashdown

"What message do you have for my country?" General Rafael Oropeza had no answer for the military official from the United States standing before him on April 11, 2002 in the military barracks of Fort Tiuna in Caracas. Colonel James Rodgers, military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, repeated the question. In the moment of the coup d'etat against President Hugo Chávez Frías, General Oropeza was charged with registering everyone who entered and exited Fort Tiuna, the base for the Venezuelan Defense Ministry and the premier military installation in the country. Photographs of Rodgers driving a vehicle around the perimeter of the Fort during the coup were published afterwards in the Venezuelan daily Ultima Noticias.

The State Department denied the existence of any James Rodgers, even though he was registered as a military attaché of the Embassy in Caracas. But the most compromising moment for the U.S. military in Venezuela during the period surrounding the April 2002 coup against President Chávez happened April 8, at a goodbye party for a Chinese military attaché, held in the luxury Hotel Melía in Caracas. It was that night, exactly, that an official of the U.S. Marine Corps, David Cazares, confused General Roberto González Cárdenas with General Néstor González Gonzáles. It was an understandable error. Both men were bald, approximately the same height and both dressed in Venezuelan Army uniforms, complete with medals and an i.d. tag that said simply, "González".

Cazares sidled up to General González and, accusingly, asked, "Why haven't you contacted the ships we have off the coast or our submarine submerged in La Guaira? What's going on? Why hasn't anyone called me? What are you waiting for?"

General González hadn't the remotest idea what the U.S. Marine officer was talking about, but before he could respond, a military attaché from Brazil approached to say goodbye. Cazares took advantage of the distraction to ask the Marine captain, Moreno Leal, standing nearby, if this was indeed General González, "the one who was stationed on the border". Moreno answered: "That is General González, but I don't know if he was stationed at the border." Cazares continued interrogating General González Cardenas, demanding to know why no-one had yet made contact with him or with the three boats and the submarine located off the Venezuelan coast. Prudently, González Cárdenas limited his responses to a simple "We'll inquire." On leaving the party, the two met again in the elevator. "This has an operative cost. I'm waiting for your answer," said Cazares firmly.

The Venezuelan general Néstor González González was a secret participant in the coup d'etat of April 2002 against President Chávez. April 10, the general appeared on national television and demanded the resignation of the president, "or we shall see". On April 12, after the failed coup, a television program aired which revealed that González González made this statement with the simple goal of preventing Chávez from traveling to Costa Rica, where he was to participate in a meeting of the OAS General Assembly that same day. The plot worked. Chávez remained in Venezuela and the coup began to unfold according to plan.

However, the erroneous exchange between Cazares and González Cárdenas that April 8 was passed to a higher level and uncovered by Venezuelan investigators after Chávez's brief demotion, while the United States simply ignored it. Cazares's term in Venezuela was reduced afterwards, and he was re-posted to Chile when the amazing article appeared in Últimas Noticias.

Another Piece in Place

On March 5, 2002, something pleasant happened for the United States. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Caracas to Washington, to the CIA, the DIA
(Defense Intelligence Agency) the NSC (National Security Council) and others, arrived with the following heading: THE UNIONS, THE BUSINESS SECTOR AND THE CHURCH ANNOUNCE A TRANSITION AGREEMENT.

The body of the cable said: "With great fanfare, Venezuela's best gathered on March 5 to listen to representatives of the Venezuelan Workers' Union, the Chamber of Commerce and the Catholic Church present their combined democratic agreement, with ten principles to guide a transitional government. This accord constitutes an important step for the opposition, which has never wavered in its condemnation of Chávez, but until this moment had not offered a comprehensive vision of its own."

The U.S. government appeared pleased with the agreement reached by the opposition on March 5, taking into account that it had brought an investment of nearly two million dollars in an effort to strengthen and unify the opposition parties. A comment in a cable from the Embassy revealed this satisfaction: "Another piece in place," wrote Cook, an embassy staffer, "this agreement could well constitute a reference point in the code of conduct for a transition government."

The remark "another piece in place" should have caught the attention of some, more than just a little. If the opposition accord for a post-Chávez transition government was another "piece" of the plan, then the overthrow of Chávez should have been the final piece in the conspiracy. The United States, continually complaining of the lack of opposition unity, reasoned that this called for an investment of some two million dollars through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in order to strengthen the political parties and help them unite around a strategy. The accord of March 5 confirmed that this investment had brought results: "another piece" had been placed correctly and the day of the final objective was approaching.

On March 11, 2002, the government of the United States was convinced that the coup had been organized.

The CIA in Venezuela sent another urgent notice to the five intelligence agencies in Washington, this time in the form of an alert. The alert was prepared for the Strategic Alert Committee of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a strictly confidential and high level group governed by the National Intelligence Office to alert and integrate the director's representatives in the National Security Agency, the DIA, and the National Mapping Agency, as well as for the undersecretary of State for Intelligence and Investigation, and the vice-director of Intelligence for the CIA. The strictly confidential alert was more specific: "There are growing signals that the Venezuelan business leaders and officials are feeling dissatisfied with President Chávez.the military could try to overthrow him."

Absolutely not!

The American ambassador in Caracas, Charles Shapiro, visited (Pedro) Carmona several times during the coup. He claimed that his visits on April 12 were to try to convince him to reinstitute the Congress and other institutions he had dissolved, but Shapiro's answers to questions about his relationships with the leaders of the opposition and the participants in the resulting coup were prefabricated and well planned. Not by him, however.

April 16, 2002, Shapiro received a cable from the State Department in Washington, with a Press Guide for Western Hemispheric Affairs, prepared by an L.S. Hamilton in the State Department, and approved by Richard Boucher, State Department spokesperson.

If they ask "Did U.S. officials meet with Venezuelan opposition officials prior to the April 11 removal of President Chávez from power," he was to memorize the following response: "U.S. officials have met with a broad spectrum of Venezuelans over the past several months both in Caracas and in Washington. U.S. officials met with business community representatives, labor union officials, Catholic church leaders, opposition political leaders, and a wide array of Venezuelan government officials."

In reference to questions about the meetings with Carmona, the Press Guide said: "If asked" - that is, don't offer information if not asked - the proper response would be: "In the course of normal diplomatic contacts, U.S. officials met with Pedro Carmona, the President of the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Fedecamaras). Our message to all Venezuelan contacts has been consistent. The political situation in Venezuela is one for Venezuelans to resolve peacefully, democratically and constitutionally. We explicitly told all of our Venezuelan interlocutors on numerous occasions and at many levels that under no circumstances would the United States support any unconstitutional, undemocratic effort, such as coup (sic), to remove President Chávez from power.

A message of "zero coups" was categorically sent, meanwhile the government of the United States was filling the pockets of coup conspirators with millions of dollars, and meeting with them from time to time to discuss their plans.

Hardly surprising then, that the response to the question "Was the United States involved in the effort to remove Venezuelan President Chávez from power?" should be "Absolutely not." 

[See also the Venezuela Freedom of Information Act web site (www.venezuelafoia.info) where all the documents regarding US meddling in Venezuela are published]

English Translation by Sue Ashdown

"What message do you have for my country?" General Rafael Oropeza had no answer for the military official from the United States standing before him on April 11, 2002 in the military barracks of Fort Tiuna in Caracas. Colonel James Rodgers, military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, repeated the question. In the moment of the coup d'etat against President Hugo Chávez Frías, General Oropeza was charged with registering everyone who entered and exited Fort Tiuna, the base for the Venezuelan Defense Ministry and the premier military installation in the country. Photographs of Rodgers driving a vehicle around the perimeter of the Fort during the coup were published afterwards in the Venezuelan daily Ultima Noticias.

The State Department denied the existence of any James Rodgers, even though he was registered as a military attaché of the Embassy in Caracas. But the most compromising moment for the U.S. military in Venezuela during the period surrounding the April 2002 coup against President Chávez happened April 8, at a goodbye party for a Chinese military attaché, held in the luxury Hotel Melía in Caracas. It was that night, exactly, that an official of the U.S. Marine Corps, David Cazares, confused General Roberto González Cárdenas with General Néstor González Gonzáles. It was an understandable error. Both men were bald, approximately the same height and both dressed in Venezuelan Army uniforms, complete with medals and an i.d. tag that said simply, "González".

Cazares sidled up to General González and, accusingly, asked, "Why haven't you contacted the ships we have off the coast or our submarine submerged in La Guaira? What's going on? Why hasn't anyone called me? What are you waiting for?"

General González hadn't the remotest idea what the U.S. Marine officer was talking about, but before he could respond, a military attaché from Brazil approached to say goodbye. Cazares took advantage of the distraction to ask the Marine captain, Moreno Leal, standing nearby, if this was indeed General González, "the one who was stationed on the border". Moreno answered: "That is General González, but I don't know if he was stationed at the border." Cazares continued interrogating General González Cardenas, demanding to know why no-one had yet made contact with him or with the three boats and the submarine located off the Venezuelan coast. Prudently, González Cárdenas limited his responses to a simple "We'll inquire." On leaving the party, the two met again in the elevator. "This has an operative cost. I'm waiting for your answer," said Cazares firmly.

The Venezuelan general Néstor González González was a secret participant in the coup d'etat of April 2002 against President Chávez. April 10, the general appeared on national television and demanded the resignation of the president, "or we shall see". On April 12, after the failed coup, a television program aired which revealed that González González made this statement with the simple goal of preventing Chávez from traveling to Costa Rica, where he was to participate in a meeting of the OAS General Assembly that same day. The plot worked. Chávez remained in Venezuela and the coup began to unfold according to plan.

However, the erroneous exchange between Cazares and González Cárdenas that April 8 was passed to a higher level and uncovered by Venezuelan investigators after Chávez's brief demotion, while the United States simply ignored it. Cazares's term in Venezuela was reduced afterwards, and he was re-posted to Chile when the amazing article appeared in Últimas Noticias.

Another Piece in Place

On March 5, 2002, something pleasant happened for the United States. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Caracas to Washington, to the CIA, the DIA
(Defense Intelligence Agency) the NSC (National Security Council) and others, arrived with the following heading: THE UNIONS, THE BUSINESS SECTOR AND THE CHURCH ANNOUNCE A TRANSITION AGREEMENT.

The body of the cable said: "With great fanfare, Venezuela's best gathered on March 5 to listen to representatives of the Venezuelan Workers' Union, the Chamber of Commerce and the Catholic Church present their combined democratic agreement, with ten principles to guide a transitional government. This accord constitutes an important step for the opposition, which has never wavered in its condemnation of Chávez, but until this moment had not offered a comprehensive vision of its own."

The U.S. government appeared pleased with the agreement reached by the opposition on March 5, taking into account that it had brought an investment of nearly two million dollars in an effort to strengthen and unify the opposition parties. A comment in a cable from the Embassy revealed this satisfaction: "Another piece in place," wrote Cook, an embassy staffer, "this agreement could well constitute a reference point in the code of conduct for a transition government."

The remark "another piece in place" should have caught the attention of some, more than just a little. If the opposition accord for a post-Chávez transition government was another "piece" of the plan, then the overthrow of Chávez should have been the final piece in the conspiracy. The United States, continually complaining of the lack of opposition unity, reasoned that this called for an investment of some two million dollars through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in order to strengthen the political parties and help them unite around a strategy. The accord of March 5 confirmed that this investment had brought results: "another piece" had been placed correctly and the day of the final objective was approaching.

On March 11, 2002, the government of the United States was convinced that the coup had been organized.

The CIA in Venezuela sent another urgent notice to the five intelligence agencies in Washington, this time in the form of an alert. The alert was prepared for the Strategic Alert Committee of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a strictly confidential and high level group governed by the National Intelligence Office to alert and integrate the director's representatives in the National Security Agency, the DIA, and the National Mapping Agency, as well as for the undersecretary of State for Intelligence and Investigation, and the vice-director of Intelligence for the CIA. The strictly confidential alert was more specific: "There are growing signals that the Venezuelan business leaders and officials are feeling dissatisfied with President Chávez.the military could try to overthrow him."

Absolutely not!

The American ambassador in Caracas, Charles Shapiro, visited (Pedro) Carmona several times during the coup. He claimed that his visits on April 12 were to try to convince him to reinstitute the Congress and other institutions he had dissolved, but Shapiro's answers to questions about his relationships with the leaders of the opposition and the participants in the resulting coup were prefabricated and well planned. Not by him, however.

April 16, 2002, Shapiro received a cable from the State Department in Washington, with a Press Guide for Western Hemispheric Affairs, prepared by an L.S. Hamilton in the State Department, and approved by Richard Boucher, State Department spokesperson.

If they ask "Did U.S. officials meet with Venezuelan opposition officials prior to the April 11 removal of President Chávez from power," he was to memorize the following response: "U.S. officials have met with a broad spectrum of Venezuelans over the past several months both in Caracas and in Washington. U.S. officials met with business community representatives, labor union officials, Catholic church leaders, opposition political leaders, and a wide array of Venezuelan government officials."

In reference to questions about the meetings with Carmona, the Press Guide said: "If asked" - that is, don't offer information if not asked - the proper response would be: "In the course of normal diplomatic contacts, U.S. officials met with Pedro Carmona, the President of the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Fedecamaras). Our message to all Venezuelan contacts has been consistent. The political situation in Venezuela is one for Venezuelans to resolve peacefully, democratically and constitutionally. We explicitly told all of our Venezuelan interlocutors on numerous occasions and at many levels that under no circumstances would the United States support any unconstitutional, undemocratic effort, such as coup (sic), to remove President Chávez from power.

A message of "zero coups" was categorically sent, meanwhile the government of the United States was filling the pockets of coup conspirators with millions of dollars, and meeting with them from time to time to discuss their plans.

Hardly surprising then, that the response to the question "Was the United States involved in the effort to remove Venezuelan President Chávez from power?" should be "Absolutely not." 

[See also the Venezuela Freedom of Information Act web site (www.venezuelafoia.info) where all the documents regarding US meddling in Venezuela are published]